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The United States Constitution Essay Introduction The Revolutionary War had come to a satisfactory conclusion, and no particular cause of urgency gripped the delegates to the Constitutional Convention, as they gathered in Philadelphia in the spring of 1787. The Continental Congress conducted all functions of the central government since the commencement of its first session in September of 1774, on the heals of the Boston Port Act. News of this latest move of the British Parliament, which ordered the closing of Bostons harbor pending the repatriation of losses suffered by the East India Company on account of Bostons infamous tea party, reached American shores in May of that year (Rakove 21). The rallying cry during the American Revolution was for American sovereignty to establish independence from Britain, while the major issues that motivated that cry centered on the protection of colonial property from the long arm of the British Parliament. Acts of Parliament in the 1760s and 1770s, such as the disturbingly invasive Stamp Act of 1765, struck many colonists as overly demanding, and intolerable violations of local control (Keane 89). While the Stamp Act was particularly inflammatory, Parliament passed numerous acts during this period, including the Sugar Act of 1764, the Declaratory Act and Townshend Acts from 1767 to 1769, and the Boston Port act of 1774 (Rakove 22). The predominant substance of these acts was taxation; the mother country felt such taxes should be expected from the colonists to assure they contributed their share toward supporting the empire and preserving the benefits all English citizens enjoyed from this empire. The safeguarding of global trade provided a prominent example; it augmented the wealth of the empire and her mercantile class. Parliament regulated this trade, and protected its continuation by the provision of war ships. But the extractions of wealth Britain demanded from her American colonists to support the empire were not seen as justified by many in America. Britain was embroiled in a long-standing war against France. The colonists believed they were being taxed excessively to support this war effort. Many colonists felt they paid their dues to the empire by suffering direct exposure to the French and Indians during recent conflicts, and resented the additional imposition of greater taxation (Keane 88). They demanded greater local control over the levels of revenue to be submitted to Britain, and an exclusive right to determine the means of collecting that revenue. Many patriots, such as Samuel Adams, worked for years to pull together a more unified American resistance to British claims. On the heals of the Boston Port Act, Adams noted that American response to it suddenly wrought a Union of the Colonies which could not be brought about by the Industry of years in reasoning on the necessity of it for the Common Safety (Rakove 40). Urgency beset the delegates as they gathered to coordinate a response to recent onerous Parliamentary measures, and government under the First Continental Congress got underway. Within a year they shifted from evaluating diplomatic responses to coordinating the American military preparedness for war against British troops. By the summer of 1776, they issued the Declaration of Independence, declaring for King and country that reform, compromise, and reconciliation no longer sufficed. Events now necessitated a clean break with the mother country. The Continental Congress, operating under the framework established by the Articles of Confederation, fulfilled American requirements for centralized government through the successful completion of the Revolutionary War in 1783, and until the fateful spring of 1787 (Bowen). What conditions caused the delegates gathered for the convention in Philadelphia in 1787 to propose a radically different government? What motivated them to propose the dissolution of the Continental Congress, and suggest that the sovereignty of their respective states be usurped by a newly formulated national government? How did issues of control over property enter into this dynamic? This paper examines and gives answers to these questions. Conditions Leading Up to the Constitution Radical in nature and revolutionary in result, the proposal formulated by the Convention of 1787 far exceeded the evolutionary goals set forth in the guidance given to delegates prior to their arrival. The state legislatures, firmly sovereign under the Articles, did not send delegates in the expectation that the result would be a Federal government subjecting the states to the will of a national sovereign. The Continental Congress sanctioned the Philadelphia convention for the sole and express purpose of revising the Articles of Confederation (Bowen 4). Instead of revising the Articles, the proposal emanating from the Convention turned the Articles into a dead letter, upon its adoption by state ratification conventions. Moreover, the delegates formulated a government so radically different in nature that its breadth and scope was not even contemplated as a realistic possibility by the population at large in the Spring of 1787 (Larson). Defects of the existing system, more than the pleasure of free intellectual discourse, provided the principle motivation for the delegates to generate the solutions contained in the new Constitution.  Ã‚   Two prominent problem areas compelled them to formulate this radical proposal for change. First, vices of the state governments, which could not be adequately restrained under the existing system, resulted in numerous problems motivating reform (Madison 4). The second set of forces at work for change was the insurmountable limitation besetting the Continental Congress in its effort to carry out its assigned functions. These forces formed pincers of change operating on the delegates. Property rights played an important role in both arms of these pincers. Many delegates at the Convention believed that the state governments often abused their authority by unjustly impacting private property rights; they looked for opportunities to curb these abuses through a newly formulated national power (Nedelsky 22-23).   Additionally, the Continental Congress lack of authority over property contributed substantially to its ineffectiveness. Restrictive trade measures pursued by both Britain and France within a year of the Treaty of Paris proved to be more detrimental to American interests than the British retention of forts on the new countrys frontier.   Britain discriminated against American commerce in numerous ways, including the closure of its own ports and those of the West Indies to ships from her lost colony. Such provocations should have been met with retaliatory commercial measures. Unfortunately, the Continental Congress lacked the authority to coordinate such measures, and since the impacts of various options fell with different force upon each state, no particular option would be readily agreed to or complied with by the various legislatures. While the British parliament coordinated trade policy to punish American commercial interests, the Americans could not coordinate a retaliatory policy to force the British to reverse their practices (Mee 30). Secure access to the Mississippi River was pivotal to the issue of commerce for all inhabitants of the Western frontier, and proved to be another source of consternation for those counting on the Continental Congress for solutions.  Ã‚   The movement of products to ports from interior lands relied on shipping them down the Mississippi, through the Gulf of Mexico, to ports on the Atlantic Ocean. Relying on over-land routes to ports on the Atlantic was unpractically expensive, in 1784, Spain declared that the Mississippi closed to American navigation (Keane 94-5). In addition to grappling with Mississippi navigational rights, Congress was also attempting to guide the development and settlement of Western lands. Setting up the framework of the nations expansion to the West, and the admission into the Confederacy of future states resulting from this settlement, was another key challenge facing Congress. As settlers streamed to the West, they required protection from the native populations, who were typically displaced without fair compensation, and who often heckled and attacked settlements in response (Mee 207-208).   Protection for such settlers could not be provided in earnest, due to the ever-present incapacity of Congress to find funds to appropriate to the cause, as well as substantial disagreement about the details of how Western settlement should proceed. During American history around the time of the crafting of the Constitution, poverty very likely did mean sloth and idleness (Bowen 70). At that time, land was an abundant resource and three-quarters of Americans earned their living in agricultural pursuits. Labor was relatively scarce; no large pool of unemployed people existed to keep downward pressure on wages. Eligibility to vote during this period typically required that one own enough property to qualify as a freeholder. Most citizens possessed property exceeding these prescribed thresholds. Robert Morris, one of the nations leading financiers, and a delegate to the Convention, estimated that ninety percent of those otherwise eligible to vote in America met the requirements to be considered freeholders (Nedelsky 77). To qualify as a freeholder in Virginia for the first elections held under the new Constitution, a white male over twenty-one years of age needed to own either fifty acres of property, or twenty-five acres with a house (Labunski 152). Even poor immigrants could normally find work that paid well enough to allow them to accumulate adequate savings to purchase land. Americans of the revolutionary era were particularly susceptible to political arguments stressing property rights. Easy availability of land had long characterized colonial society, and by the time of the revolutionary crisis the ownership of land was widespread. Indeed, this broad distribution of property was one of the most distinctive features of colonial life, in marked contrast with the situation in England. Even landless persons could reasonably hope to become owners eventually (Labunski 160-3). Achieving any reform through amending the Articles of Confederation required the agreement of all thirteen states. All prior attempts at amendments failed to achieve such a consensus. Rhode Island did not send delegates to the Convention, and for years openly admitted that the state had no interest in allowing modifications to the Articles. While the delegates ostensible purpose was to propose an evolution to government under the Articles, such a path already had a track record of failure. The performance of the state governments caused much concern. The Continental Congress lacked the authority to check the transgressions of the states or carry out essential national functions on their own accord (Bowen 235). These conditions convinced the gathering delegates that action was required. Many of their most significant concerns with governmental operations at the state level and national level were connected to the issue of property rights. The Founding Fathers gathered in Philadelphia with a desire to retain a government founded on the republican principle of majority rule, while also formulating new safeguards for the protection of property beyond those present under state governments. Previous attempts at evolution proving fruitless, the delegates turned to revolutionary proposals in pursuit of these aims. Constitutional Convention As Madison entered the Pennsylvania State House to attend the Constitutional Convention, in May of 1787, he struggled to resolve the tension between formulating a republican government based on the will of the majority, and preserving justice for the minority in matters of personal liberties, such as the protection of property. Establishing a strong enough tether to protect the minority from such measures while still preserving republican principles would not be easy. What steps did the framers take in establishing a republic to protect property rights from being plundered by the majority? They successfully pursued both explicit language to protect property, and a structural design that implicitly lead to the protection of property. The resulting construction left many particular questions about property unanswered, but bestowed to future generations a government framework that rested on republican principles while also assuring a relatively high level of protection for the rights of the propertied minority.  Ã‚   The success of Madison and his compatriots at this endeavor, in the form of our Constitution, placed American government on a strong foundation from which to proceed (Labunski 189-94). The Constitution contains explicit language establishing authorities related to property rights and safeguards for the protection of private property. Before addressing the way the new governments structural design implicitly protects the rights of those holding property, these explicit provisions will be reviewed. They are predominantly located in Article I of the Constitution, which outlines the legislative framework of the new government. The framers aimed to place significant new limits on the ability of states to enact legislation assaulting property rights or redistributing property, such as the troublesome wave of debtor relief laws states subjected creditors to in the years following the Revolutionary War. Language in Article I, Section 10, established specific restrictions on the power of states.   Included therein was a prohibition on forcing creditors to accept payment tendered in anything other than gold or silver coin, also known as specie (Larson 198). Section 8 of Article I, which delineated the powers given to the new national Congress, granted that body the power to coin money and regulate its value, while Section 10 prohibited the states from doing so.   This language took aim at the notorious practice of printing money, which often turned out to be valueless, and forcing creditors to accept it as payment for debt. The framers also attempted to protect the property of creditors from plunder by reinforcing contractual obligations binding debtors and creditors (Ely 45). In a move destined to have far-reaching implications relative to the sanctity of contract law, and its importance in protecting propertied interests under all contractual arrangements, Section 10 prohibited states from enacting any law impairing the obligation of contracts (Larson 207). These provisions, along with the assurance provided under Article VI that all debts valid under the Confederation remained enforceable under the Constitution, were all efforts to protect the property of creditors. They shielded the minority creditor class from the political muscle the debtor class brandished so successfully under the Articles of Confederation. The regulation of commerce impacts private property, by influencing its value in numerous ways and providing a venue for its fair trade. As with the production of coins, the framers both explicitly granted Congress the power to regulate commerce, and prohibited states from interfering with such regulations. The previous section explored many of the areas in which the limited authority the Continental Congress exercised over commerce between states and with foreign powers caused difficulties.   The gathering of the Philadelphia Convention of 1787 followed a Convention held in Annapolis, Maryland in 1786, which gathered primarily for the propose of proposing amendments to the Articles of Confederation that would allow for the national regulation of commerce (Larson 207). Delegates from only five states arrived at the Annapolis Convention; such meager participation made it clear that any substantive measures emanating from the gathering would be stillborn. But, instead of dispersing with no action at all, Madison and others present called on the states to send delegates to Philadelphia nine months later to devise such further provisions as shall appear to them necessary to render the constitution of the federal government adequate to the exigencies of the Union (Rakove 374). The weak Continental Congress could not prevent such measures, and commercial regulations between the various states and between states and foreign powers often despoiled the value of property by establishing regulations to assist some groups with little regard for the interests of others. The explicit limits in Section 10 on state powers included language clarifying that states could not lay any imposts on imports or exports or enter into any compacts with other states without the consent of Congress. Particularly important to delegates from the land-rich southern states, Section 9, which spelled out specific limits on the power of the national Congress, provided protection for the propertied agrarian interests by banning any tax on exports (Ely 43-4). The state governments demonstrated their lack of resolve to provide adequate protections to property rights under the Articles of Confederation. In all the areas discussed above, delegates attempted to remedy this within the republic being constructed by explicitly placing matters in the hands of the national government and limiting the power of state legislatures. Madison feared this would not be enough, and worked hard to achieve another safeguard from the destructive power of the states. While constructing a government based on the principle of majority rule inherently resulted in some threat to the personal liberties of the minority, Madison believed the new national government afforded better protection for such liberties than the state governments. He therefore fought to provide the national government with the power to veto any measures passed by the state legislatures, as a means of holding the untrustworthy state governments in check (Labunski 247). On the issue of taxation, those desiring more power be shifted to the central government won a major victory at the Philadelphia Convention. Experience under the Articles of Confederation demonstrated that for the national government to be effective, it must not be left to rely on the willingness of the states to provide revenue. Unlike the issues above, no language would prevent states from taking action in the area of taxes; this would be an area of mutual responsibility. The list of powers explicitly granted to Congress in Article I, Section 8, begins with the power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises (Larson 205). Under the Articles of Confederation, the central government lacked the means of carrying out most measures, because the states often refused to provide funds when requisitioned to do so. Alexander Hamilton, in Federalist Paper #15, claimed that this inability to raise revenue by acting directly on citizens was the great and radical vice in the construction of the existing confederation (108). The delegates agreed with Hamilton and others that this limitation must be remedied to allow any central government to operate effectively. Many believed the best solution would leave the power of direct taxation only in the hands of the state government, and grant a coercive power to the national government, by which it might force the states to comply with requisitions. However, the Federalists believed this position to fanciful, pointing out that coercing states resulted inevitably in coercing actual citizens. In mustering military force against a state that did not fulfill a requisition, it would inevitably be the citizens of that state receiving the blows, for example. The state, an ephemeral geo-political entity, can not itself be coerced (Doughtery 171). Worse yet, any measures meant to induce obedience would inevitably punish indiscriminately. It would not be only those unwilling to pay their share of a requisition in a state that would suffer from such measures. Applying coercive measures could not be a surgical exercise of carving out only the malignant specimen. It would instead be like a knight charging toward a phalanx landing his blow upon any member of the line present at the end of his lance. All citizens of a state would be subject to the suffering resulting from any coercive measures. Ratification of The Constitution Vesting the central government with the ability to raise taxes and thereby redistribute property directly, without working through the states, required achieving a proper balance between providing the central government with inadequate power and excessive power.  Ã‚   The resulting compromise required that any direct taxation by the national government would be apportioned according to population, which shielded those with land wealth from shouldering exorbitant shares of federal expenditures (Ely 43-4). Despite the efforts of those at the Convention, the issue of taxation proved to be one of the most contentious issues during the Constitution ratification debates held in each state. In the debate leading up to the slim margin of victory for the Federalists supporting the Constitutions ratification, the Anti-Federalists kept bringing this issue to the surface as a prominent example of the new governments excessive power. After this vote, the Virginians turned to developing Constitutional amendments to forward to the new government for consideration and adoption. The vote to forward an amendment limiting the central governments ability to directly tax passed by a wider margin than the vote on the ratification of the Constitution itself, indicating that even some of its supporters harbored concerns about giving the new government such power (Labunski 115). Though the word slave does not appear in the Constitution, three specific provisions strengthening the hands of slave-owners in the protection of their property interests were granted, in an effort to attain Southern support for the resulting document. First, it was agreed in Article I, Section 9, that importation of such persons as any of the states now existing shall think proper to admit could not be regulated by Congress prior to 1808 (Larson 206). Second, language in Article IV established that fugitive slaves must be returned to their owners, even in the event they cross state lines. While these two provisions treated slaves as property, the third provision dealt with determining the strength of each states representation in the House of Representatives. Southern delegates wanted them counted as people in formulating the distribution of representatives in Congress, to assure the adequate protection of their interests at the national level. On this last point, the delegates reached a compromise of counting three-fifths of the slave population for the purposes of Congressional apportionment (Larson 208). These provisions all strengthened the position of slave owners, and substantiate the claim that slavery was more clearly and explicitly established under the Constitution than it had been under the Articles (Ely 46).   However, it would be a mistake to accuse the delegates to the Convention of being oblivious to the moral implications of slavery. Indeed, the ability to hold other humans as slaves under established property law placed vexing restraints on the delegates ability to claim that property rights flow out of natural law. No one in 1787 defended the ownership of slaves as included among the natural rights of property. And yet most of the framers believed that since slavery existed as a matter of positive law, slave owners could claim the right to have their property secure. This painful reminder that not all positive rights of property were natural rights, or perhaps even consistent with natural rights, meant that the arguments for the security of property could not simply rely on claims of natural right (Nedelsky 153). It would be more accurate to conclude that slavery protections were an inevitable extension of the general importance the delegates placed on property rights, than to reach the conclusion that slavery itself was hotly contested, and that property protections grew out of any overarching debate on the topic of slavery. Many present at the Convention despised the peculiar institution, and most were morally uncomfortable with it, but accepted its existence as an extant political reality. Its management was incidental to the larger issue of protecting property rights in general, and its existence limited the ability of the delegates to claim that those protections flowed inextricably from mans natural rights (Larson). The framers achieved a desirable balance on the issue of property rights in the development of the Constitution. They enhanced the autonomy of individuals living under the resulting government by their efforts to balance governments power over property against the rights of individuals over property.   They substantially enhanced the power of the central government over property compared to government under the Articles of Confederation, while curbing the ability of state governments to impact property. They retained republican principles such as the rule of the majority. Thereby, no individual possessed absolute control over property. Nobody could think of themselves as a king with rights to property granted by God, and count on complete immunity from governmental impacts on property or redistribution of property (Ely). On the other side of the balance, explicit language and implicit structural safeguards were established to protect property rights and other essential liberties for everyone, even those in the minority. No large republics existed when the framers did this work, so they could not simply draw on the experience of others. They were familiar with a long history of monarchs and nobility holding onto power and wielding it to protect their property rights. They were also familiar with government under the Confederation, which brought the benefits of republican government to the citizens of America, but did not adequately safeguard property from the political agenda of a majority looking to improve their position at the expense of property owners. In the Constitution, the founders achieved a desirable balance, and succeeded in constructing a government that preserved republican virtues while also protecting minority liberties, such as the protection of property rights. Conclusion The framers of the Constitution placed a high priority on protecting the rights of individuals to acquire, accumulate, and appropriate property. Balancing the protection of property rights with the establishment of a national government founded on the republican principle of upholding the interests of the majority provided a key challenge for the members of the Constitutional Convention. The Articles of Confederation left sovereign power in the hands of each of the confederated states. The state constitutions, while far from uniform, all provided republican forms of government. As such, state legislative bodies responded readily to the outcries of their constituents. The majority wielded substantial power to achieve their aims, regardless of the justice of their cause. This often resulted in a lack of protection for the property of the more affluent minority, as they struggled against the will of the majority to redistribute property. The Founding Fathers judged many state legislative actions, pursued by the will of the majority, to be an unscrupulous taking of property from one group to benefit another. In particular, debtor relief acts, passed in the wake of the Revolutionary War, often heavily favored the debtor class over the propertied financiers of the war effort. The delegates that gathered at the Philadelphia Convention in May 1787, felt compelled to formulate a government providing greater protection for individual property rights. At the same time, they remained committed to retaining a system predicated on republican principles. No legitimate republican government could simply disregard the will of the majority by placing a cabal of the propertied few perpetually in power. The structure and operation of the government that grew out of the Constitution they created came about in no small measure due to efforts to balance tension between protecting the rights of individuals to safeguard property, and the rights of a republican government to exercise control over property for the benefit of the majority of the public. Viewed within the context of their place in history, the compromises they established in response to this tension were appropriately crafted to enhance the autonomy of those citizens living under the resulting government. Bibliography Bowen, Catherine Drinker. Miracle at Philadelphia: The Story of the Constitutional Convention May to September 1787. Boston, Massachusetts: Little, Brown and Company, 1986. Ely, James. The Guardian of Every Other Right: A Constitutional History of Property Rights. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990. Keane, John. Tom Paine, A Political Life. Boston, Massachusetts: Little, Brown and Company, 1995. Labunski, Richard. James Madison and the Struggle for the Bill of Rights. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006. Larson, Edward F. and Michael P. Winship, Eds. The Constitutional Convention: A Narrative from the Notes of James Madison. New York: The Modern Library, 2005. Madison, James. Vices of the Political System of the United States, 1787, Teaching American History, 2007 http://www.teachingamericanhistory.org/library/index.asp?document=802 Mee, Charles L. The Genius of the People. New York: Harper Row, 1987. Nedelsky, Jennifer. Private Property and the Limits of American Constitutionalism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990. Rakove, Jack N. The Beginnings of National Politics. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1979.